Engineering UAP — The Missing Link

High-ranking military officials, and likely members of the Department of Defense, have serious concerns regarding the United States’ defensive capability if forced into a confrontation with UAP.

The former director of the Department of Defense, Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP), Lue Elizondo provides an interesting analogy in a recent , after being asked why the US government has not been more transparent about UAP over the decades.

In analyzing this rather complex existential analogy, framed in a way only Lue Elizondo could articulate, he puts us into the mind of an American General, perhaps in the 1950s or 60s, your job is to protect National Security, or in other words, “your job is to be paranoid.”

In the analogy, the United States Government (USG) is aware of the unidentified aerial phenomenon (UAP), penetrating US airspace and can outperform anything we have, making us essentially defenseless against this entity.

The USG is also aware UAP are observing our nuclear equities, which could be interpreted as preparation for the battlefield, presumably scouting our weaknesses, and monitoring locations and quantities of our nuclear assets. The infiltrators don’t appear to be benevolent as there is no indication that they’ve ever assisted humanity, meaning they’re either malevolent or, like us, unpredictable.

Elaborating further, Elizondo indicates that just having discussions openly about UAP, as Congress is doing right now, may give an indication to “others” that we are aware of their behavior, and are investigating their actions, as indicated in the new National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) legislation language.

Senator Kristen Gillibrand, who sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, calls for investigations associated with the production, transportation, and storage of nuclear weapons or components associated with UAP incursions at nuclear weapons facilities.

In his rather unsettling conclusions, Elizondo indicates that the mere fact that not keeping UAP related information secret could create a reaction that the United States is not prepared to address.

Some members of the military, who may have known about UAP decades ago, felt that it was their patriotic duty not to inform the American public of a possible threat, to which we had no defense, and risked mass hysteria. Unsurprisingly, Elizondo disagrees with the idea of concealing critical information from the public and said:

The reality is, Lue Elizondo is not going to waste his time nor ours, providing hypothetical scenarios for entertainment purposes, everything he says has a purpose, and he’s been at it for four years.

YouTube clip:

Former Director of AATIP, Lue Elizondo

One could interpret Elizondo’s analogy in a few ways.

The United States military is greatly advanced in comparison to the technology that we were using in the ’50s and ’60s. The USG has likely been conducting research with exotic materials for decades and may have a level of confidence in their defense capabilities to begin a conversation with the American public, which would help answer why now.

Conversely, this may only be providing insight as to Elizondo’s ongoing struggles with the Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence agencies and the Air Force (USAF) to provide cooperation and data to Congressional lawmakers.

Ultimately, some high-ranking military officials, and likely members of the DOD, had serious concerns regarding the United States’ defensive capability if forced into a confrontation with UAP, and perhaps still do.

Responsibility for the operation of the United States ground-based intercontinental ballistic missile systems (ICBM) falls on the Air Force Global Strike Command and was established for the improvement of the management of the USAF portion of the United States’ nuclear arsenal, which accounts for two-thirds of America’s nuclear deterrent.

The Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) is a Major Command (MAJCOM) of the United States Air Force. AFGSC provides combat-ready forces to conduct strategic nuclear deterrence and global strike operations in support of combatant commanders.

Air Force Global Strike Command is the Air Force’s service component of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).

Additionally, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) is Air Force Materiel Command’s (AFMC) center of expertise for nuclear weapon systems. The AFNWC is the single AFMC voice for integrating nuclear weapon systems requirements and nuclear weapon system resource management.

It seems apparent that the USAF is unwilling to take any ownership of UAP nuclear site incursions, if it’s never confirmed it never happened.

Air Force Capt. Robert Salas, was at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana in 1967 when 10 ICBMs he was overseeing suddenly became inoperative, at the same time base security informed him of a mysterious red glowing object hovering over the front gate.

Robert Hastings’s research includes interviews with over 150 nuclear launch officers, nuclear missile targeting officers, maintenance personnel, and security guards who guarded the nuclear weapons facilities. Hastings’ research was substantiated and validated by the DODs Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP), based on with Lue Elizondo.

The USG nor the United States Air Force has ever made an official statement regarding UAP incursions at nuclear weapon or storage facilities.

Luring and Baiting UAP

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As discussed in a , investigative journalist Ross Coulthart stated in a podcast last year that his sources told him “there has been consideration given to offensively trying to bring down these objects.”

Former US SCI communications officer, Bob Fish recounted in Coulthart’s book “In Plain Sight ‘’, that the USG had obtained frequencies that were detected emanating from UAP entering Earth’s atmosphere, nearly 40 years ago.

While Fish made these observations in the 1970s, some believe the frequencies were known as far back as 1960. James McDonald found UFOs emitted radio signals that oscillated between 2995 to 3000 MHz frequency of 600 Hz.

Presumably, these frequencies allow the United States military to detect, track and predict UAP locations.

With that being said, what information could AATIP glean when monitoring UAP interactions with nuclear material?

When placing nuclear materials as bait you would want to be able to identify how they are interfering with the componentry. If the equipment used for baiting were wired to monitor minute changes in current and electromagnetic deviations, the results might provide clues as to how the information is gathered by UAP.

Reportedly, ICBM nuclear launch personnel had indicated in reports that beams of light emanating from the UAP were projected down in the nuclear silos and nuclear storage facilities. The investigations would want to discern the decision-making process regarding how its scanning might compare to an AI program or sentient being performed these tasks.

It stands to reason that a series of tests would be needed, to essentially profile UAP behavior and possibly intent. The locations of these interactions would likely be monitored and recorded with the USGs sophisticated sensor systems at a distance and also nearby.

Predicting UAP activity with luring and baiting techniques has gleaned some successes for AATIP based on recent with Lue Elizondo.

Art by Winston Gambro

Lastly, in interviews, Elizondo had indicated that electromagnetic pulse (EMP) may have the ability to affect the flight, or movement of UAP and bring them down.

While difficult to ascertain under what circumstances this would be a reasonable course of action, beating your adversaries to understand this technology is likely a motivator. Presuming exotic materials are already in the possession of the USG, and being researched, you may need more pieces of the technological puzzle to unlock its mysteries.

The reality of shooting down UAP could hold severe consequences and questions the moral ground on which we stand, let us hope that wiser minds prevail.